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Abstract 
 
Detailed data on individual applicants to a large public university are used to demonstrate 
that net price responsiveness decreases with need and ability.  Enrollment effects are 
simulated and show a movement towards a high tuition/high aid (low tuition/low aid) 
policy significantly lowers (raises) tuition revenue with a modest increase (decrease) in 
the number of aid-eligible students. 
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Aim High or Go Low? Pricing Strategies and Enrollment Effects  
when the Net Price Elasticity Varies with Need and Ability 
 
There is a broad national consensus among academics, policy makers, and college 
administrators that expanding college access to higher education for low-income students is crucial 
to developing an effective U.S. poverty policy (St. John, 2003).  Education policy pundits disagree, 
however, on whether the most auspicious tuition policy to expand access should follow a high 
tuition/high aid (HH) model that targets aid or a low tuition/low aid (LL) model that provides 
universal aid (Mumper, 2003).  Specifically, HH proponents contend that on efficiency and equity 
grounds list tuition should reflect the true cost of college, but that the actual price net of aid should 
reflect one’s ability to pay (Mortenson, 1993; Schorr, 1988).  Conversely, LL advocates argue that 
college subsidies should be spread more evenly over the student population, because targeted aid 
programs are unable to attract the necessary long-term popular support and funding (Wilson, 1987; 
Johnstone, 1997).   
Implicit in both the HH and LL models are some form of subsidy motivated by the notion 
that higher education has a public as well as a private return.  Moreover, de facto public policy has 
led to the real cost of college net of aid increasing for all students (i.e., a higher real tuition, lower 
real aid) with the rationale that the return to college has increased in recent decades and is primarily 
private in nature (Card, 1999). Thus, the largely theoretical debate regarding the efficacy of the HH 
versus LL pricing strategies on access takes place in the context of an increasing public expectation 
that students are, and should be, responsible for covering the lion’s share of the cost of college 
(Heller, 2001). 
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This paper enters the HH-LL debate in the context of a single large public university, the 
University of Oregon (UO), by examining the access, quality, and revenue consequences of moving 
away or towards their explicit LL-mission for (needy) in-state students and implicit HH-policy for 
(able) out of state students.  The UO is an ideal setting to study differences in price responsiveness 
by need and ability because prior work suggests that net price variation (i.e., tuition minus aid) is 
largely determined at the institution level and because flagship public institutions tend to attract a 
deep and heterogeneous pool of freshman applicants (Curs & Singell, 2002). On the other hand, 
McMillen, Singell, and Waddell (2007) find that there is a hierarchy of institutions that compete 
across different applicant pools comprised of students who likely differ in their overall price 
responsiveness, suggesting significant heterogeneity across institutions in their ability to implement 
various pricing strategies.  It follows that the joint understanding of the access, quality, and revenue 
effects of the HH and LL models are critical to assessing whether such policies are feasible in the 
context of the mission and resources of similarly situated flagship public institutions. 
While there is a paucity of institutional empirical evidence regarding the impact of the HH 
or LL pricing models on access, summaries of enrollment demand studies consistently find that 
students are relatively unresponsive to changes in the tuition price for a wide variety of institution 
types (Heller, 1997; Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). Economic theory generally measures price 
responsiveness as an elasticity, defined as the percentage change in the number enrollees for a 
given percentage change in tuition.  Thus, an elasticity exceeding the critical value of one implies 
that enrollment responds relatively more in percentage terms to a tuition change (i.e., students are 
relatively responsive to a price change), whereas a value less than one implies that enrollment 
responds relatively less in percentage terms than tuition (i.e., students are relative unresponsive to a 
price change).   
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Tuition revenue, defined as tuition multiplied by enrollment, also directly relates to the 
elasticity.  Specifically, if enrollment is responsive to tuition (i.e., an elastic demand) then revenue 
will move in an opposite direction to the tuition change, whereas if enrollment is unresponsive to 
tuition (i.e., an inelastic demand) then revenue will move in the same direction as the tuition 
change.  For example, an increase in tuition would lead to a decrease in tuition revenue if demand 
is elastic because the enrollment decrease more than offsets the tuition increase, whereas, with 
inelastic demand, the enrollment decline is relatively small and tuition revenue rises.  DesJardins 
and Bell (2006) describe in further detail how economic theories, and more specifically elasticity, 
inform enrollment management practices.   
For a HH model to truly be effective, institutions must have a group of students whose 
enrollment demand is relatively inelastic, or unresponsive, such that a university could potentially 
raise revenue by increasing the tuition revenue generated by those students.  This increased revenue 
could then be used to finance grant programs that would lower the net price to a targeted subgroup 
of financially needy or academically able students (Rose & Sorenson, 1992).  Thus, the ideal 
conditions for a HH model to be effective include a large group of potential students that are 
relatively unresponsive to price changes and a smaller group of desirable students who are 
relatively responsive to changes in price.  Turner (2006) describes the case of The University of 
Virginia, a public flagship institution, which is expected to have sufficient excess demand of 
relatively price unresponsive applicants such that a HH policy is expected to yield both increased 
access to low-income students and increased revenue to the institution.   
As needy students may well be financially constrained when it comes to attendance at 
public institutions in their home state, and highly able students may well have competing merit aid 
offers, both of these groups of students are likely to be less responsive to the net price at a 
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particular university than those students who are less likely to receive either need-based or merit-
based aid.  It follows that understanding whether there are differences in the net price elasticity by 
need and ability is critical to assessing the potential enrollment and distributional consequences of a 
HH or LL pricing strategy.  This paper provides some of the first formal evidence that non-aid 
eligible students are relatively price responsive (i.e., have an elasticity that exceeds one) and that 
the price responsiveness falls with need and ability at a large public flagship university.   
We undertake a two-step process to understand how tuition and financial aid policies 
influence the composition of UO enrollees by need and ability.  First, to determine whether the 
price responsiveness of applicants differs across need and ability we estimate the net price 
elasticities for nine different need-ability groups.  Second, the elasticity estimates are used to 
simulate the differential impact on the enrollment of needy and able students of the UO moving 
towards a HH or LL pricing scenario.  The simulations indicate that a movement towards a HH 
policy modestly increases the number of aid-eligible students while significantly lowering the net-
tuition revenue, whereas a movement towards a LL policy yields a modest decrease in the number 
of aid-eligible students while significantly raising net-tuition revenue.  Overall, the findings 
demonstrate there are revenue and enrollment tradeoffs from adopting either the HH or LL model, 
each of which has political and financial ramifications.   
Background 
 Theoretical models of institutional choice posit that students choose an institution that best 
matches desired characteristics, which include economic and sociological factors (e.g., Cabrera, 
Burkum, & La Nasa, 2005; Fuller, Manski, & Wise, 1982; Jackson, 1978).  Sociological factors 
that are expected to influence institution choice include family background, high-school peers, and 
a preference for interacting with similar persons.  Economic factors expected to influence college 
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choice include socio-economic status, price, return on investment, and the consumption value of 
college.  Comprehensive reviews of college choice models can be found in Cabrera and La Nasa 
(2000), Hossler, Braxton, and Coopersmith (1989), Paulsen (1990), and Perna (2006). 
More complex models of college choice hypothesize a multi-stage decision making process 
for potential students where potential students develop aspirations for higher education in the first 
stage, identify a set of institutions to apply to in the second stage, and choose the institution to 
attend in the final stage (Cabrera & La Nasa, 2000; Hossler, Braxton, & Coopersmith, 1989; 
Hossler & Gallagher, 1987; Paulsen, 1990; Perna, 2006).  A handful of multiple stage empirical 
models show that price responsiveness measures may be understated when an analysis exclusively 
focuses on the enrollment stage because price can also affect aspirations and application decisions 
(Abraham & Clark, 2006; Curs & Singell, 2002; DesJardins, Ahlburg, & McCall, 2006).  The multi 
stage sticker shock phenomenon is expected to yield a larger effect on the aspirations, application  
and college choice behavior of low- and middle-income families where cost is a larger determinant 
of the college-going decision (Kane, 1999; King, 1999; McPherson & Schapiro, 1998). Thus, 
although our paper follows the bulk of the literature that focuses on the enrollment choice stage, the 
results from the multi-stage empirical research suggest that our single-stage simulations may well 
offer lower bound enrollment and revenue effects for the HH and LL pricing strategies. 
Both the higher education and economics literature consistently find that the decision to 
enroll and persist in college differs with need and ability (e.g., Dynarksi, 2004; Ehrenberg & 
Sherman, 1984; Jackson, 1990; Linsenmeier, Rosen, & Rouse, 2002; McPherson & Schapiro, 
1991; Singell & Stone, 2002).  For example, Manski and Wise (1983) find that students with high 
academic ability and those from families with higher parent income and education are more likely 
to enroll in and complete college.  Prior work also finds differences in tuition and financial aid 
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responsiveness based on attributes that correlate with need and ability.  St. John (1990) shows that 
college enrollment is positively correlated with grants, loans, and work-study and negatively 
correlated with tuition, where there is generally a greater price-responsiveness to aid versus tuition 
changes and the effects of grants (loans) fall (rise) with income.  
 Student price responsiveness has been estimated using time-series variation in aggregate 
prices and enrollment for a broad set of universities (Campbell & Siegel, 1967) or a single 
institution (Seneca & Taussig, 1987) and individual variation in the net price and the decision to 
enroll for a random cross-section of college-age persons (Tierney, 1982) or for applicants to a 
specific university (Ehrenberg & Sherman, 1984).  Surprisingly, despite substantial variation in 
both the degree of aggregation and the time period of the data, enrollment elasticity estimates are 
consistently found to be inelastic for both public and private universities (Doyle & Cicarelli, 1980; 
Parker & Summers, 1993) and for different racial and income groups (Blakemore & Low, 1983; 
Wetzel, O’Toole, & Peterson, 1998).  However, a survey of enrollment demand studies by Heller 
(1997) notes that the majority of work uses data that predate the significant real rise in tuition that 
began in the early 1980s and suggests that enrollment demand may have become more elastic over 
the last several decades.  Heller’s comments are consistent with demand theory which predicts 
price responsiveness rises as prices become a larger share of the decision maker’s budget.   
 The evidence that the price elasticity differs by easily observed attributes (e.g., need and 
ability) suggests that institutions have a revenue incentive to charge different net prices to students 
that do not differ in their cost of instruction (i.e., price discrimination).  For example, several 
former Secretaries of Education, beginning prominently with William Bennett, expressed concern 
that universities capture federal aid through tuition increases (Bennett, 1987).  McPherson and 
Shapiro (1991), Turner (1998), Long (2004), and Singell and Stone (2007) all find evidence that 
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tuition and other price levels rise, for at least some segments of the higher education market, with 
the increased public provision of financial aid.  These findings support theoretical work that 
demonstrate circumstances when it is in an institution’s interest to offer discounts or internal 
scholarships to maximize the revenue by exploiting elasticity differences between different types of 
students (Epple, Romano, & Sieg, 2002; Kolpin & Stater, 2006; Rothschild & White, 1995). 
 The policy effectiveness of the HH and LL models also rests on whether group differences 
in enrollment elasticities can be exploited to achieve enrollment management objectives.  For 
example, Rose and Sorensen (1992) examine the HH model assertion that universities can expand 
access by raising tuition to non-needy students in order to fund generous financial aid packages for 
needy students.  Using cross-sectional data for tuition and aid from 502 private universities, they 
find that high tuition institutions offer more, but insufficient, aid to offset the higher list price such 
that the price net of aid increases under an HH policy.  This paper explicitly examines whether the 
price responsiveness differences across need and ability groups of students can limit the enrollment 
management and revenue objectives of the HH and LL models. 
Empirical Approach 
Empirical Model 
 A college choice framework is developed to examine how applicants to an institution 
respond to tuition and aid policies.  Specifically, UO applicants are modeled as choosing to enroll 
or not, where applicants who do not enroll may select a number of alternatives including enrolling 
at a competing institution or entering the labor market.  Given this framework, a random utility 
approach is adopted where applicant i selects the UO over competing alternatives when this choice 
provides the student the greatest utility among all possible choices.  The specific utility level of 
applicant i enrolling at institution j is not observed, but the decision of applicant i to enroll at the 
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UO is observed if and only if the utility of enrolling at the UO exceeds the utility of the next best 
alternative.  
Following this framework, the decision to enroll at the UO can be modeled as the linear 
index function: 
[1] 
1
,
0i i i i i
if enrolled
E P X where E
if not
α β ε ⎧′= + + = ⎨⎩  
where the dependent variable ( iE ) is a binary variable that equals 1 if an applicant enrolls at the 
UO and 0 if not.  The evaluation of the utility maximizing choice of applicant i is a function of the 
net price of the UO ( iP ), personal attributes ( iX ) and a normally distributed disturbance term ( iε ).  
The random utility approach is commonly used in economics and provides a basis for estimating 
equation [1] using a probit model of the discrete choice to enroll or not at the UO based upon the 
aforementioned controls (Curs & Singell, 2002; DesJardins, Ahlburg, & McCall, 2006).   
The Net Price Measure 
 The probability of enrolling at the UO depends directly on the net price parameter, α , 
which provides a measure of the enrollment response to the net price conditioned on student 
attributes.  Because the UO is a destination campus with relatively few commuter students, the net 
price is defined as the tuition plus room and board minus scholarships and grants.  Loans are 
included as a separate control variable and are not used in the net price calculations because they 
must be repaid and, although including a subsidy in some instances, do not lower college costs 
dollar for dollar.  Likewise, work-study is included separately from the net price measure as the 
work requirement imposes a separate cost on the student. The net price variable varies across time 
due to changes in tuition charges and aid generosity and varies across individuals due to difference 
in financial aid packages.   
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 With respect to price, economic theory predicts that the enrollment decision depends solely 
on the relative net price of the institutions within a student’s choice set.  However, despite a 
theoretical rationale for a net price metric, prior research has found a differentiated response across 
tuition and financial aid that calls for a more complex differentiated price model to study the price 
response of students (Paulsen, 2001; St. John, 2003).  Consistent with the economic predictions and 
following most prior research our model restricts a dollar increase in grants and scholarships to be 
equivalent to a one dollar decrease in the price, whereas the less generous forms of aid (loans and 
work-study) are permitted to yield differential effects as would be expected given the less than 
dollar-for-dollar impact on the net price (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987; Heller, 1997).   
We use the net price elasticity because it permits us to compare the price responsiveness 
across groups by normalizing price and enrollment changes into percentage changes.  Specifically, 
the net price measure is normalized by the average price over the period such that a change in the 
net price variable measures the percentage change in the price.  It follows that calculating the 
marginal effect (delta-p statistic) for the net price variable, as estimated through a probit estimation 
of equation [1], measures the price elasticity of demand.  The estimated net price elasticities across 
income and ability categories will be used to evaluate how a movement towards a HH or LL model 
will effect enrollment across the need-ability distribution of UO students.  
Control Variables 
 In addition to tuition controls, prior institutional demand models include controls for the 
financial, academic, personal, behavioral, and peer group attributes of applicants (e.g., Curs & 
Singell, 2002; DesJardins, Ahlburg, & McCall, 2006; Ehrenberg & Sherman, 1984).  While our 
analysis focuses on characteristics of the applicant that have been included in prior work, the 
elasticity results are robust to a number of alternative sets of controls.  For example, dropping any 
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of the sets of regressors included in the financial, academic, personal, behavioral, and peer group 
attributes do not change the qualitative findings with respect to the net price variables.  
Specifically, although the magnitudes of the coefficients may change with the inclusion and 
exclusion of the various sets of controls, we find that the coefficient signs and elasticity 
interpretations remain robust.  Further, the results with respect to price constructs are consistent 
with prior studies which utilize admissions data from the UO (Curs, 2008; Curs & Singell, 2002; 
Singell & Stone, 2002, 2007).  Although our estimates are not sensitive to the specification, we use 
the fully specified model that minimizes the potential for omitted variable bias in interpretation and 
the simulations.  
 Academic attributes are measured by the applicant’s prior academic performance as 
indicated by their high school GPA and cumulative SAT score.  These academic performance 
measures may well have differential effects across the ability distribution of students.  Specifically, 
good students are more likely to do well at the UO, but are also likely to have better external 
opportunities that become more affordable as their parent’s income rises. 
 Personal attributes include a binary variable that equals one if the applicant is female, 
Asian, African American, or Hispanic.  These controls permit the UO enrollment response to differ 
by race and gender.  As the UO is located in a largely white, middle-class, moderately-sized city 
the institution might well differentially attract students according to their personal attributes.   
 Behavioral attributes are intended to capture a student’s predisposition to attend the UO and 
include the age the student first contacts the UO and the age the student applies to the UO.  In 
particular, a younger contact age may reflect a relatively greater interest in the UO, whereas age at 
application may well be inversely correlated with the likelihood of enrollment because the UO is a 
residential campus that historically enrolls younger students.  Our controls for the predisposition to 
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attend the UO also include binary variables that equal one if a student is an Arts and Science or 
Professional major versus the excluded group of applicants with undeclared majors.  The controls 
for major reflect the fact that students may sort non-randomly across schools and colleges.   
 Peer group academic attributes are measured by the average SAT score in the student’s high 
school  and whether they attended a private high school.  The group performance measures provide 
a relative reference for the applicant’s own SAT score.  The median household income for the ZIP 
code of the student’s parents is also included to measure the income level of the applicant’s peers, 
which might affect the college aspirations of the student.  
Data 
 The empirical analysis uses data from the UO admissions office for Fall-term freshman 
applicants for the academic years 2000-2001 through 2004-2005.  The analysis focuses on Fall-
term freshman applicants who constitute the majority (96%) of new applicants and enrollees and 
who differ distinctly from winter and spring term applicants that are often comprised of 
nontraditional/transfer students.  Overall, our data contain complete information on 34,143 
applicants to the UO.  More specifically, our data contain 17,810 in-state and 16,333 out-of-state 
applicants of which 54% and 21% enrolled, respectively.  Table 1 provides summary statistics for 
the in-state and out-of-state samples.   
Empirical Results 
The Average Enrollment-Price Elasticity for In-state and Out-of-State Students 
 Following prior work, the enrollment model described in equation [1] is estimated using 
separate probit specifications for in-state and out-of-state applicants (Curs & Singell, 2002).  
Relative to their out-of-state counterparts, Oregonians pay lower tuition at the UO, face a different 
mix of public and private alternatives within their home state, and are not (at least conceivably) 
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selecting from the broad menu of similarly priced flagship public institutions across the United 
States. Table 1 demonstrates that the average total cost (tuition, fees, room and board) faced by out-
of-state students is more than double that for in-state students.   
Tuition and aid differences by residency status are particularly critical in the context of 
estimating a net price elasticity of demand.  Specifically, because federal, state, and institutional aid 
tends to rise with the cost of attendance, students who attend college in-state operate in a relatively 
LL-oriented model and out-of-state students operate in a HH-oriented model.  Economic theory 
predicts and our subsequent empirical analysis confirms that in-state students who face a relatively 
lower net price have a significantly smaller elasticity of demand than out-of-state students.  
Moreover, a chi-squared statistic from a likelihood ratio test comparing a model that restricts all 
coefficients to be the same across residency status versus our proposed models that permits each 
coefficient to differ with residency status is rejected at the one percent level. Thus, there are sound 
theoretical and empirical rationales for estimating the probit specifications separately by residency 
status. 
As a point of reference before separating by need and ability, it is useful to estimate the 
model for all in-state and out-of-state students, which has been the primary approach adopted in 
prior research estimating the enrollment response to tuition.  The results of this specification are 
presented in Table 2.  All coefficients presented in the text and tables are marginal effects 
calculated at the median value of each independent variable (delta-p statistic), thus, they can be 
interpreted as the change in the probability of enrollment associated with a one unit change in the 
independent variable.  Similar to prior research results, in-state students are found to have an 
inelastic net price response with an estimated elasticity of -0.87 and out-of-state students are found 
to be more responsive than their in-state counterparts with an elasticity estimate of -1.20.  While 
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the price responsiveness of the average UO student appears to be relatively low, subsequent results 
indicate that price elasticity estimates vary substantially with income and ability, indicating that 
some students are very responsive to changes in the net price. 
The empirical relationships with regard to the non-price related controls generally confirm a 
priori expectations of mixed selectivity effects consistent of a public flagship university with an 
explicit access mission.  For example, for both in-state and out-of-state students, the enrollment 
probability decreases with both SAT score and high school GPA.  Females and non-white students 
are less likely to attend the UO for both in-state and out-of-state students.  Applicants who apply at 
younger ages and those applying to professional schools are more likely to attend UO, while 
applicants to the College of Arts and Sciences are less likely to attend UO. With respect to peer 
group controls, students from areas with lower median household income are more likely to attend 
the UO and students from private high schools are less likely to attend UO.  For brevity, and 
because the control variables are relatively robust to alternative specifications, the remainder of the 
discussion focuses on the net price measures that are of primary interest. 
The Need-Ability Groupings 
 The previous results indicate that the enrollment-price elasticity differs between in-state and 
out-of-state students.  At the same time, access to merit- and need-based aid differs systematically 
by need and ability, which could well alter students’ relative price responsiveness by affecting their 
relative opportunities.  For example, it is likely that students of higher ability or higher need would 
have higher probabilities of receiving both financial aid from UO and larger financial aid offers 
from other institutions in their choice set and, thus, may be less responsive to financial aid offers 
from the UO.  Such differences are critical to evaluating how a movement away or towards a HH 
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(or LL) model would impact student choices and, ultimately, the composition of students by need 
and ability attending the UO.   
 To examine whether students of differing need and ability respond differently to changes in 
the UO net price, the enrollment model presented in Table 2 is re-estimated separately for a matrix 
of 9 need-ability categories, reflecting the implicit or explicit differences in these applicant’s 
opportunities and costs.  The categories are defined along a three-by-three continuum of need and 
ability, such that students within a group are relatively similar in terms of need and ability and such 
that the middle category can be though of as the group of students that may or may not qualify for 
need- or merit-based aid.  In other words, the middle categories in the three-by-three need-ability 
matrix represent the group of otherwise similar students who are most likely to experience changes 
in both merit- and need-based aid based in response to small changes in their academic and/or 
financial attributes.   
 The three need categories (non-needy, somewhat-needy, and needy) delineate a student’s 
ability to pay for college.  Non-needy students are those students who do not qualify for Federal 
need-based aid either because they have not completed a Free Application for Federal Student Aid 
(FAFSA) or because they have completed a FAFSA and have negative financial eligibility as 
determined by Federal need-based aid standards.  Financial eligibility is calculated as the difference 
between the cost of attendance (COA) at the UO and the student’s expected family contribution 
(EFC) based on FAFSA information.  Students with positive financial eligibility are eligible for 
Federal need-based aid programs such as the Pell Grant, Supplementary Educational Opportunity 
Grant, and the subsidized Stafford Loan.     
The somewhat-needy category is defined to include students who are eligible for subsidized 
student loans, but are generally not eligible for the maximum level of Federal grant aid (e.g., Pell 
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grants).  In other words, somewhat needy students are defined around the margin of receiving the 
most generous forms of need-based aid, which occurs for approximately two-thirds of the students 
with positive financial eligibility.  Thus, for simplicity, needy and somewhat-needy applicants are 
defined to yield a one-third versus two-thirds split, respectively, of students who have positive 
financial eligibility.  This split also insures sufficient sample sizes in the needy and somewhat 
needy categories to obtain precise elasticity estimates.   
 It is important to emphasize that non-needy out-of-state students generally have a higher 
level of income than comparable non-needy in-state students with the equivalent eligibility for 
Federal financial aid because need is determined not only by the student’s ability to pay (EFC) but 
also by the cost of attending (COA) the UO, which is higher for out-of-state students.  As out-of-
state tuition exceeds in-state tuition, the range of financial eligibility for somewhat-needy in-state 
applicants is smaller ($1-$8000) than for out-of-state applicants ($1-$13,000).  It follows that in-
state students have lower eligibility (>$8000) to qualify as needy in relation to what is required to 
qualify for out-of-state students (>$13,000).   
 The three academic ability categories (less-able, somewhat-able, and able) represent 
increasing academic performance in high school as measured by high school GPA.  In particular, 
the primary scholarship program at the UO requires a minimum 3.5 high school GPA in order to be 
eligible for merit aid.  Other factors influencing the awarding of merit aid at the UO include the 
difficulty of their high school curriculum, the year they apply, and the quality of the applicant pool.   
Thus, the less-able category is defined as those with less than a 3.5 GPA who do not qualify for 
merit aid.  The somewhat-able category is defined such that some, but not all, of the applicants 
qualify for a merit aid.  Specifically, a high school GPA between 3.5 and 3.65 may or may not 
qualify an applicant for a scholarship, with merit aid decisions for this group being dependent on a 
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variety of other factors beyond simply high school GPA.  However, able students with a high 
school GPAs above 3.65 generally qualify for and receive merit aid from the UO.  
Enrollment-Price Elasticity Estimates across Need and Ability 
 Table 3 presents the estimated net price elasticities for UO in-state and out-of-state 
freshman applicants estimated using separate probit specifications for the nine need-ability groups. 
The specifications in Table 3 are identical to those presented in Table 2, however, results for the 
non-price variables have been excluded for ease of presentation.  Thus, the focus is on the variation 
in the net price elasticity estimates across the nine need-ability groups for in-state and out-of-state 
students. 
The net price results for in-state freshman applicants are presented in a three-by-three 
matrix on the left-hand side of Table 3 and suggest two systematic patterns of price responsiveness 
to changes in the UO net price.  First, the estimated net price elasticity estimates indicate that price 
responsiveness falls with ability holding need constant.  The decline in price responsiveness across 
ability is consistent for all three need categories, indicating that students with higher academic 
abilities are less responsive to price changes when controlling for their financial need and other 
factors.  While the inverse relationship between ability and price responsiveness may appear 
counter intuitive, it is important to remember that much of the variation in the net price across 
ability levels arises from variation in aid generally and scholarships in particular.  In other words, 
within a particular year, all students within each residency group face the same tuition price, and 
the net price varies solely due to differences in financial aid.  In this light, the results suggest that 
responsiveness to aid declines with ability.  This is not surprising since opportunities for financial 
aid at competing institutions are also likely to improve with ability.  Thus, given that scholarships 
are generally not given to persons at the bottom of the ability distribution, the results suggest that 
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scholarships are most effective at encouraging applicants to enroll from the middle and bottom of 
the ability distribution.  This result may also suggest that more able students who have access to 
scholarships across institutions come to expect scholarship support at their ultimate enrollment 
choice. 
 Second, the neediest students are the least responsive to changes in net price at the UO 
controlling for ability.  While the neediest group is the least price responsive across all ability 
categories, price responsiveness does not necessarily decline as need rises for all ability groups.  In 
fact, the difference in the price responsiveness for the non-needy and somewhat-needy groups was 
generally not statistically significant for the different classes of ability.  As the majority of need-
based aid is derived from Federal sources and can accompany an applicant to any of the institutions 
they choose, it is not surprising that needy students are the least responsive to changes in the net 
price of the UO.  For example, if needy applicants receive a larger than expected Pell Grant offer at 
the UO, they would also receive this increase at any of the other institutions to which they have 
applied.  The perceived drop in price is universal, and has not lowered the UO’s relative price.  
However, as the financial need level for a student falls, the mix of institutional versus Federal 
financial aid in their package at the UO is likely to increase such that observed aid increases reflect 
a real reduction in the price of the UO relative to other institutions.  Thus, the price responsiveness 
of the somewhat- and non-needy student groups are more likely to truly reflect the effectiveness of 
UO financial aid offers at altering these students’ likelihood of attending the UO. 
The out-of-state net price enrollment elasticity estimates, presented in columns 4 through 6 of 
Table 3, indicate that applicants in the middle of the need distribution tend to be the most price 
responsive.  Thus, reductions in the net price through grants and scholarships have the greatest 
enrollment impact on out-of-state students who are in the middle of the need distribution for UO 
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applicants.  In other words, students who are in the middle of the need distribution are the marginal 
students who are most influenced by the provision of aid.  Non-needy students tend to be less 
responsive because higher-cost alternatives to the UO tend to be preferred and these students can 
more readily afford these options.  On the other hand, needy students are less responsive because 
they tend to be financially constrained such that low-cost public institutions in their own states are 
generally preferred to more costly out-of-state public institutions.   
Alternatively, the price responsiveness of out-of-state applicants to the UO generally decreases 
as ability levels rise, similar to that of in-state students.  Again, this result is consistent with the fact 
that high ability students are more likely to receive merit-based aid packages across their choice set 
of schools such that the price discount is not unique to the UO.  However, unlike our findings for 
in-state students, somewhat-able, non-needy applicants from out of state are found to be the least 
responsive to price.  This finding may be indicative of the fact that non-needy students are the least 
likely to rely on finances as an important factor in the college choice decision.  In other words, 
although somewhat-able students are less likely than able students to receive generous financial aid 
awards across their choice set of schools, the non-needy among them are less constrained by 
finances in their choice of institution.  
Simulations  
Simulation Format 
Many large public universities attract an academically and demographically similar student 
body to the UO and have a similar competitive position within the hierarchy of institutions with 
regard to price and institutional attributes.  Thus, the significant differences in the estimated price 
elasticity across need-ability groups at the UO indicate that tuition and financial aid policy can 
potentially influence the composition of enrollees by need and ability across a relatively numerous 
21 
 
  
set of similarly situated institutions.  It follows that we use UO enrollment data for fall term 
freshman in 2005 and the nine elasticity estimates to simulate the enrollment and institutional net 
revenue effects of two widely employed tuition and aid policies within higher education.  These 
simulations are broadly applicable only within in the set of comparatively similar institutions to the 
UO. 
As the estimated net price elasticity tells us the estimated percentage change in enrollment 
with respect to a one percent change in net price, we calculate the simulated enrollment by need-
ability category as the product of the original enrollment, the estimated net price elasticity, and one 
plus the simulated percentage change in price.  Specifically, given the net price elasticity estimates 
and the assumed change in net price, the percentage change in enrollment can be calculated as: 
[2] % %PQQ E PΔ = ∗ Δ  
Where % QΔ  is the percentage change in enrollment, PQE  is the estimated price elasticity of 
demand presented in Table 3 for each need-ability group, and % PΔ  is the percentage change in 
price associated with given tuition policy.   
Suppose that a tuition policy was adopted that raised the net price by 5 percent, then the 
predicted enrollment change could be estimated using the net price elasticity.  For example, the 
predicted percentage enrollment change for the non-needy, less able group of in-state students in 
the HH model presented in row 2, column 3 of Table 3 is calculated as: 
[3] % % 3.344 5.0% 16.7%.PQQ E PΔ = ∗ Δ = − ∗ = −    
The -16.7% figure in [3] is derived using the 5.0 percentage change in the price as presented in row 
1, column 3 of Table 4 and the -3.344 net price elasticity presented in row 1, column 1 of Table 3. 
High-Tuition/High-Aid Simulation 
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 We first consider a movement towards a HH policy often adopted by selective, largely 
private, universities.  This policy ostensively charges high list tuitions to limit excess enrollment 
demand and uses the additional revenues to cross subsidize needy (and sometimes relatively able) 
students with high levels of institutional aid.  To simulate a movement towards a HH pricing model 
at the UO, we first conduct a thought experiment that raises the net price to students who would not 
qualify for merit- or need-based aid by five percent and then determine what would be the 
necessary net price reduction offered to needy and able students such that there is no change in the 
total enrollment of the institution.  We keep enrollment constant so that distributional changes can 
be made in comparison to the same base and the costs or benefits of the HH or LL models are 
defined solely in terms of revenue.  Given that both the net price and the net price elasticity differ 
by residency status, separate simulations are conducted for in-state and out-of-state students.  Thus, 
the HH simulation results are presented in Tables 4 and 5 for in-state and out-of-state students, 
respectively. 
Needy and able students at UO, both in-state and out-of-state, are found to be less 
responsive to changes in the net price (i.e., have smaller net price elasticity estimates).  Thus, the 
simulations indicate that the net price charged to needy and able students must decline by more 
than five percent to offset the enrollment decline of non-aid-eligible students who, by design, have 
experienced a five percent net price increase.  In particular, needy and able in-state (out-of-state) 
students would need to experience a 10.6 (7.0)1 percent net price decrease in order to ensure that 
enrollments were unaffected by the adoption of a high tuition, high aid model.   
 The movement towards a HH policy also affects the composition of the student body. 
Specifically, the number of needy in-state (out-of-state) enrollees is estimated to increase by 6.0 
(7.9)2 percent resulting in an overall increase from 33 to 35 (23 to 25) percent of the overall 
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incoming freshman class.  Similarly, the enrollment of able in-state students is predicted to increase 
by 9.6 (6.4)3 percent resulting in an overall increase from 45 to 49 (35 to 38) percent of the overall 
incoming freshman class.  Thus, it appears that a targeted aid can effectively be used to increase the 
enrollment of aid-eligible students. 
However, altering the composition of the student body in favor of aid eligible students is 
costly.  Specifically, keeping the need-ability composition of the in-state applicant pools constant, 
the tuition revenue earned by the institution is predicted to decline by over $1.14 million due to the 
fact that the net price discounts given to aid eligible students exceed the net price induced revenue 
received from non-aid-eligible students.  Similarly, the revenue decline predicted in the simulation 
for out-of-state students is estimated to be $228 thousand from a shift towards a HH model. 
   It is important to emphasize that the simulation does not account for the fact that a 
movement towards a HH model might well be expected to favorably influence the applicant pool 
through an increase in applications from needy and/or able students, which would reduce the 
negative revenue effects (Curs & Singell, 2002).  These findings highlight the fact that the variation 
in the price responsiveness across the need-ability distribution (at the UO and other similarly-
situated flagship public institutions) will generally make the cross-subsidization of aid-eligible 
students by non-aid-eligible students impractical and that a HH model will generally require an 
infusion of non-tuition related income to fund the policy.  
Low-Tuition/Low-Aid Simulation 
 A movement towards a LL model, which has been historically adopted by less-selective 
public universities, typically charges low list tuition to foster access for in-state students (regardless 
of need or ability) while offering relatively limited institutional need- or merit-based aid.  To 
simulate a movement towards a LL pricing model at the UO, we conduct a second thought 
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experiment that eliminates all institutional financial aid, while keeping state- and Federal-based 
financial aid at their present levels, and estimates the percentage decrease in net-tuition for all 
students that would result in no change in overall freshman enrollment.  Given that both the net 
price and the net price elasticity differ by residency status, separate simulations are conducted for 
in-state and out-of-state students.  Thus, the simulation results are presented in Tables 6 and 7 for 
in-state and out-of-state students, respectively. 
The elimination of institutional financial aid leads to a 18.0 (4.2)4 percent increase in net 
price for needy in-state (out-of-state) students.  Likewise, the removal of institutional aid leads to a 
13.3 (12.5)5 percent net price increase for able in-state (out-of-state) students.  The simulations 
imply that, given the estimated elasticity estimates and in the absence of institutional and state-
based financial aid, the list tuition for those in-state (out-of-state) students who are not aid-eligible 
could be lowered by an average 5.7 (4.8)6 percent in order to keep fall term freshman in-state (out-
of-state) enrollments constant.  The movement towards a LL model can offset the enrollment 
reduction due to the relatively large increase in the net price (due to the elimination of institutional 
aid) to aid-eligible students with a relatively small reduction in the net price (which in this case is 
equivalent to the list price) to non-aid eligible students.  The cross-subsidization described is 
possible because non-aid eligible students are relatively more price responsive at the UO (i.e., they 
have relatively higher elasticity estimates).   
The removal of a targeted aid program that increases the net price for aid-eligible students 
and reduces the net price to non-aid eligible students will clearly yield a student body with 
relatively fewer needy and able students.  In particular, the simulation predicts that needy, in-state 
(out-of-state) enrollment would decline by 9.8 (0.9)7 percent, which would result in an overall 
reduction in the percent of all in-state (out-of-state) students who are needy from 33 to 30 (23.0 to 
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22.8) percent.  Likewise, the simulation predicts that the enrollment of able in-state and out-of-state 
students would decline by 10.5 (10.7)8 percent, which reduces their overall share in the incoming 
class from 45 to 40 (35 to 32) percent for in-state (out-of-state) students.   
The movement towards a LL model, although clearly harming an institution’s ability to 
recruit needy and able students, permits the state to provide access to its constituents at a lower 
overall monetary cost.  Specifically, the simulated LL plan would raise average net price revenues 
from in-state students by $601 and from out-of-state students by $339.  Assuming no change in the 
composition of the applicant pool, this would result in nearly $1.0 million in extra tuition revenue 
without changing the number of in-state students attending and $220 thousand from out-of-state 
students.  Thus, the LL model clearly trades off the common interest in the recruitment of top 
students with increasing needs for greater tuition revenues.  Such tradeoffs, while perhaps 
unpalatable to faculty, are made more relevant by the reduction in the state financing of public 
higher education. 
Discussion 
 The reduction in state support for higher education and the resulting heightening of 
competition within public higher education has caused policy pundits and college administrators to 
contemplate alternative pricing strategies to insure access and improve academic quality.  Many 
public universities have sought to follow their elite private counterparts by moving towards a HH 
model to manage their enrollments and generate greater tuition revenue (Turner, 2006).  The HH 
strategy makes economic sense in the context of prior evidence that enrollment demand is inelastic 
such that tuition revenue can be raised by increasing the net price charged to well-to-do, less 
meritorious students and using the new revenue to subsidize needy and/or able students.  The 
collective interest in attracting needy and able students within higher education, however, yields 
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greater relative opportunities for these students.  Such opportunity differences would be expected to 
make needy and able students relatively less price responsive and limit or even prevent the 
effective use of the HH pricing strategy, particularly at less selective public institutions that do not 
have significant excess enrollment demands.   
 This paper is the first to examine whether net price responsiveness differs across need and 
ability for a particular large public institution and to explore the potential enrollment and revenue 
ramifications of adopting alternative pricing strategies.  The net price elasticity estimates for nine 
need-ability groups indicate that price responsiveness generally declines with both need and ability 
for both in-state and out-of-state students.   The robustness of the price-elasticity variation across 
need and ability for both in-state and out-of-state students for the University of Oregon is important 
because it suggests a consistent pattern of price responsiveness at both a relatively low-tuition, low-
aid orientation used on in-state (needy) students and for a relatively high-tuition, high-aid 
orientation used on (able) out-of-state students.  Our findings are likely to extend to other public 
flagship institutions that attract similar students and that tend to follow similar pricing strategies.  
We also demonstrate how the elasticity estimates can be used to simulate the enrollment 
and revenue effects of moving towards an HH or LL pricing strategy. In particular, simulations 
show that a movement towards a more HH oriented pricing policy constrained to maintain current 
enrollment levels will necessarily lower tuition revenue at competitively similar institutions to the 
UO.  This result follows because the aid increases (i.e. net price reductions) necessary to attract a 
greater number of needy and able students must exceed the net price increases to students who are 
not eligible for aid.  Thus, a movement towards a HH pricing strategy, while raising the predicted 
representation of needy and able students, requires greater non-tuition revenues (i.e., government or 
private support) to fund the policy.  Thus, these elasticity and revenue findings jointly indicate that 
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such institutions could only successfully implement a HH pricing strategy if they are able to 
reverse the tide of declining government support for higher education or if they are able to 
overcome their historical limitations for private fundraising.  Our findings suggest that similar 
exercises for relatively selective institutions is an important avenue of future work as these schools 
likely have applicant pools that exhibit more revenue-favorable variation in their price elasticities 
and greater external (non-tuition related) funding, which may be the only circumstance when the 
HH pricing strategy is feasible. 
State disinvestment in higher education has moved flagship public institutions away from 
their historical LL pricing strategy with low state-subsidized tuition and relatively little institutional 
aid.  Our elasticity estimates are also used to simulate the enrollment and revenue effects of a move 
back towards a LL pricing strategy. The simulations show that less generous aid packages reduce 
the relative representation of needy and able students, whereas tuition revenues increase with lower 
average tuition prices because non-aid-eligible students are relatively price responsive. It follows 
that a movement towards a LL pricing strategy may be a relatively low-cost means of encouraging 
students to attend college in their home state.  Further research needs to be conducted to understand 
if the real tuition growth brought about by declining state support can explain the growing 
proportion of out-of-state students at flagship public institutions.  
Overall, the findings from this paper suggests that the effectiveness of any pricing strategy 
depends on the relative price responsiveness of the targeted versus non-targeted student 
populations.  This is important because there is growing heterogeneity across states and institutions 
in the types of targeted aid.  For example, a number of states have adopted state-based merit aid 
programs such as the Georgia Hope Scholarship that offer scholarships to Georgia residents who 
earn at least a B average.  At the same time, a growing number of institutions have adopted targeted 
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need-based aid programs such as the Carolina Compact at the University of North Carolina that 
guarantees to meet all unmet need for admitted students.  Alternatively, the DC Tuition Assistance 
program is neither merit or need-based, but provides grants of up to $10,000 to cover the difference 
between in-state and out-of-state tuition for DC residents. The distributional and revenue effects of 
these hybrid pricing strategies are not well understood and require a more complete picture of 
difference in the price responsiveness of students both within and across institutions.  
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Endnotes 
1.  For the HH tuition model, the percentage decrease in price to needy and able students to 
keep enrollments constant, given a 5 percent increase on all other students, can be found in 
row 7, column 9 for needy students and row 5, column 12 for able students in Table 4 (5) 
for instate (out-of-state) students. 
2.  Row 8, column 9. 
3.  Row 6, column 12. 
4. Row 7, column 9 of Table 6 for instate and Table 7 for out-of-state needy students. 
5. Row 5, column 12. 
6. Row 1, column 3. 
7. Row 8, column 9. 
8. Row 6, column 12.
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Table 1: :  Summary Statistics 
     
Panel A: In-State Students (n=17810) Mean St. Dev. Min. Max 
 Enrolled at UO 0.54 0.50 0 1 
 Total Price of UO (Tuition, fees, Room&Board)1 13.12 1.68 10.67 16.41 
 Pell Grant1 0.17 0.45 0 5.81 
 Institutional Scholarships1 1.20 1.90 0 18.07 
 Loans1 4.79 5.25 0 42.25 
 Work-study1 0.58 0.95 0 4.03 
 Cumulative SAT2 11.30 1.61 4.40 16.00 
 High School GPA 3.57 0.34 1.89 4.00 
 Female 0.58 0.49 0 1 
 Asian 0.08 0.27 0 1 
 African American 0.02 0.13 0 1 
 Hispanic 0.03 0.18 0 1 
 Age at first contact 17.33 0.67 12.17 27.38 
 Age at application 17.89 0.46 15.27 27.35 
 Applied to Arts & Science 0.30 0.46 0 1 
 Applied to a professional school 0.34 0.47 0 1 
 Median household income1 46.71 12.66 14.74 128.85 
 Average SAT Score of applicants high school2 10.56 1.31 0 13.26 
 Attended private high school 0.08 0.28 0 1 
      
Panel B: Out-of-State Students (n=16333) Mean St. Dev. Min. Max 
 Enrolled at UO 0.21 0.41 0 1 
 Gross Price of UO (Tuition, fees, Room/Board) 1 27.86 3.09 21.95 31.95 
 Pell Grant1 0.01 0.10 0 1.59 
 Institutional Scholarships1 1.88 2.67 0 18.31 
 Loans1 7.04 11.23 0 36.97 
 Work-study1 0.39 0.88 0 3.13 
 Cumulative SAT2 11.72 1.39 5.70 16.00 
 High School GPA 3.47 0.37 1.80 4.00 
 Female 0.56 0.50 0 1 
 Asian 0.10 0.29 0 1 
 African American 0.02 0.13 0 1 
 Hispanic 0.04 0.19 0 1 
 Age at first contact 17.40 0.62 12.25 27.53 
 Age at application 17.80 0.45 15.03 27.91 
 Applied to Arts & Science 0.34 0.47 0 1 
 Applied to a professional school 0.29 0.45 0 1 
 Median household income1 66.57 27.23 0 200.00 
 Average SAT Score of applicants high school2  10.76 1.93 0 15.10 
 Attended private high school 0.26 0.44 0 1 
1 All monetary variables measured in 2006 constant dollars and scaled by 1000.   
2 SAT scores are scaled by 100. 
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Table 2: :  Marginal Effects for Probit Model of Enrollment 
 Enrolled at the University of Oregon 
Independent Variable In-state Out-of-State 
Net price -0.8721** -1.1987** 
 (0.0172) (0.0209) 
Loans 0.0082** 0.0021** 
 (0.0009) (0.0003) 
Work-study -0.1435** -0.0734** 
 (0.0056) (0.0042) 
Cumulative SAT -0.0499** -0.0278** 
 (0.0030) (0.0022) 
High School GPA -0.2778** -0.2789** 
 (0.0139) (0.0090) 
Female -0.0567** -0.0148* 
 (0.0086) (0.0060) 
Asian -0.1334** -0.0557** 
 (0.0153) (0.0075) 
African American -0.2815** -0.0638** 
 (0.0268) (0.0132) 
Hispanic -0.1957** -0.0576** 
 (0.0213) (0.0103) 
Age at first contact -0.0013 0.0049 
 (0.0073) (0.0060) 
Age at application -0.0609** -0.0328** 
 (0.0106) (0.0083) 
Applied to Arts & Science -0.0728** -0.0113 
 (0.0100) (0.0066) 
Applied to a professional school 0.0423** 0.0355** 
 (0.0096) (0.0073) 
Median household income -0.0011** -0.0006** 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Average SAT Score of applicants high school 0.0039 -0.0027 
 (0.0031) (0.0014) 
Attended private high school -0.1328** -0.0515** 
 (0.0146) (0.0060) 
Observations 17810 16333 
Standard errors in parentheses.  ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%.   
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Table 3: Net Price Enrollment Elasticity 
 In-State Students  Out-of-State Students 
  
Non 
Needy 
Somewhat 
Needy Needy  Non Needy 
Somewhat 
Needy Needy 
Less Able -3.344** -2.749** -0.656**  -1.270** -3.307** -1.653** 
  (3800) (911) (2015)  (6020) (699) (1508) 
  [0.500] [0.588] [0.565]  [0.190] [0.334] [0.242] 
Somewhat Able -2.257 -2.560** -0.520**  -0.481** -2.454** -0.821** 
  (1395) (395) (810)  (1526) (252) (431) 
  [0.497] [0.611] [0.601]  [0.152] [0.308] [0.188] 
Able -1.106** -1.116** -0.501**  -0.866** -1.358** -0.564** 
  (4458) (1372) (2654)  (3628) (757) (1459) 
  [0.435] [0.513] [0.507]  [0.169] [0.272] [0.182] 
Number of observations is in parentheses and the percent of applicants enrolled is in the square 
brackets.  For in-state students non-needy are not eligible for federal aid, somewhat-needy 
students have eligibility between $0 and $8,000, and needy student have eligibility greater than 
$8,000. For our-of-state students non-needy are not eligible for federal aid, somewhat-needy 
students have eligibility between $0 and $13,000, and needy student have eligibility greater than 
$13,000.  For both in-state and out-of-state students able have GPAs greater than 3.65, 
somewhat-able have GPAs between 3.5 and 3.65, whereas less-able students have GPAs less 
than 3.5 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 4: Simulation of a High-Tuition/High-Aid Policy for In-State Students 
Simulation based upon actual University of Oregon in-state enrollment and net price data for Fall-term 2005. 
  Non-Needy Somewhat-Needy Needy Group Total 
    
2005 
Actual 
2005 
Simulated 
Pct. 
Change 
2005 
Actual 
2005 
Simulated 
Pct. 
Change 
2005 
Actual 
2005 
Simulated 
Pct. 
Change 
2005 
Actual 
2005 
Simulated 
Pct. 
Change 
Less-Able                          
 Net Price $13,128 $13,784 5.0% $13,054 $13,707 5.0% $9,086 $8,123 -10.6% $11,868 $11,717 -1.3% 
 Enrollees 375 312 -16.7% 92 79 -13.7% 209 224 7.0% 676 615 -9.0% 
Somewhat-Able              
 Net Price $13,045 $13,697 5.0% $12,669 $13,302 5.0% $8,281 $7,403 -10.6% $11,113 $10,892 -2.0% 
 Enrollees 127 113 -11.3% 37 32 -12.8% 107 113 5.5% 271 258 -4.9% 
Able               
 Net Price $11,541 $10,318 -10.6% $11,158 $9,975 -10.6% $7,992 $7,145 -10.6% $10,315 $9,262 -10.2% 
  Enrollees 404 451 11.7% 110 123 11.8% 253 266 5.3% 767 841 9.6% 
Group Total              
 Net Price $12,409 $11,988 -3.4% $12,122 $11,695 -3.5% $8,448 $7,556 -10.6% $11,054 $10,389 -6.0% 
  Enrollees 906 876 -3.3% 239 235 -1.8% 569 603 6.0% 1714 1714 0.0% 
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Table 5: Simulation of a High-Tuition/High-Aid Policy for Out-of-State Students 
Simulation based upon actual University of Oregon out-of-state enrollment and net price data for Fall-term 2005. 
  Non-Needy Somewhat-Needy Needy Group Total 
    
2005 
Actual 
2005 
Simulated 
Pct. 
Change 
2005 
Actual 
2005 
Simulated 
Pct. 
Change 
2005 
Actual 
2005 
Simulated 
Pct. 
Change 
2005 
Actual 
2005 
Simulated 
Pct. 
Change 
Less-Able                          
 Net Price $25,560 $26,838 5.0% $25,310 $26,576 5.0% $23,686 $21,981 -7.2% $25,151 $25,668 2.1% 
 Enrollees 242 227 -6.4% 42 35 -16.5% 72 81 11.9% 356 342 -3.9% 
Somewhat-Able              
 Net Price $24,315 $25,531 5.0% $24,742 $25,979 5.0% $23,754 $22,044 -7.2% $24,254 $24,776 2.2% 
 Enrollees 51 50 -2.4% 11 10 -12.3% 17 18 5.9% 79 77 -2.0% 
Able               
 Net Price $21,826 $20,255 -7.2% $21,947 $20,367 -7.2% $19,924 $18,489 -7.2% $21,324 $19,800 -7.1% 
  Enrollees 122 130 6.2% 50 55 9.8% 66 69 4.1% 238 253 6.4% 
Group Total              
 Net Price $24,309 $24,576 1.1% $23,617 $23,096 -2.2% $22,092 $20,554 -7.0% $23,693 $23,357 -1.4% 
  Enrollees 415 406 -2.2% 103 100 -3.3% 155 167 7.9% 673 673 0.0% 
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Table 6: Simulation of a Low-Tuition/Low-Aid Policy for In-State Students 
Simulation based upon actual University of Oregon in-state enrollment and net price data for Fall-term 2005. 
  Non-Needy Somewhat-Needy Needy Group Total 
    
2005 
Actual 
2005 
Simulated 
Pct. 
Change 
2005 
Actual 
2005 
Simulated 
Pct. 
Change 
2005 
Actual 
2005 
Simulated 
Pct. 
Change 
2005 
Actual 
2005 
Simulated 
Pct. 
Change 
Less-Able                          
 Net Price $13,128 $12,377 -5.7% $13,054 $12,377 -5.2% $9,086 $9,788 7.7% $11,868 $11,692 -1.5% 
 Enrollees 375 447 19.1% 92 105 14.3% 209 198 -5.1% 676 750 11.0% 
Somewhat-Able              
 Net Price $13,045 $12,377 -5.1% $12,669 $12,377 -2.3% $8,281 $9,812 18.5% $11,113 $11,483 3.3% 
 Enrollees 127 142 11.6% 37 39 5.9% 107 97 -9.6% 271 278 2.4% 
Able               
 Net Price $11,541 $12,377 7.2% $11,158 $12,377 10.9% $7,992 $10,195 27.6% $10,315 $11,684 13.3% 
  Enrollees 404 372 -8.0% 110 97 -12.2% 253 218 -13.8% 767 686 -10.5% 
Group Total             
 Net Price $12,409 $12,377 -0.3% $12,122 $12,377 2.1% $8,448 $9,966 18.0% $11,054 $11,655 5.4% 
  Enrollees 906 960 6.0% 239 241 0.8% 569 513 -9.8% 1714 1714 0.0% 
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Table 7: Simulation of a Low-Tuition/Low-Aid Policy for Out-of-State Students 
Simulation based upon actual University of Oregon out-of-state enrollment and net price data for Fall-term 2005. 
  Non-Needy Somewhat-Needy Needy Group Total 
    
2005 
Actual 
2005 
Simulated 
Pct. 
Change 
2005 
Actual 
2005 
Simulated 
Pct. 
Change 
2005 
Actual 
2005 
Simulated 
Pct. 
Change 
2005 
Actual 
2005 
Simulated 
Pct. 
Change 
Less-Able                          
 Net Price $25,560 $24,333 -4.8% $25,310 $24,333 -3.9% $23,686 $22,793 -3.8% $25,151 $24,024 -4.5% 
 Enrollees 242 257 6.1% 42 47 12.8% 72 76 6.2% 356 381 6.9% 
Somewhat-Able              
 Net Price $24,315 $24,333 0.1% $24,742 $24,333 -1.7% $23,754 $23,592 -0.7% $24,254 $24,174 -0.3% 
 Enrollees 51 51 0.0% 11 11 4.1% 17 17 0.6% 79 80 0.7% 
Able               
 Net Price $21,826 $24,333 11.5% $21,947 $24,333 10.9% $19,924 $23,130 16.1% $21,324 $23,993 12.5% 
  Enrollees 122 110 -9.9% 50 43 -14.8% 66 60 -9.1% 238 212 -10.7% 
Group Total              
 Net Price $24,309 $24,333 0.1% $23,617 $24,333 3.0% $22,092 $23,014 4.2% $23,693 $24,032 1.4% 
  Enrollees 415 418 0.6% 103 101 -1.5% 155 154 -0.9% 673 673 -0.1% 
              
 
